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Abstract 
Medical school usually has the highest tuition fees among the university 
departments. The reason why students pay such expensive fees is that they estimate 
that their earnings will greatly increase after graduation. We construct a model about 
student behavior on entering college and estimate the value-added of medical schools 
using college data from Japan. Our results show that a school with a long tradition of 
providing high quality education is evaluated as rendering high value-added to students. 
Those empirical results enable us to simulate the effects of the privatization of a public 
university. This simulation indicates that there is no difference between public and 
private schools when the tuition fees of the public university become as high as those of 
the private university. 
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1. Introduction 
Medical school usually has the most expensive tuition fees among the various 
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schools in universities. For example, according to “Tuition and Student Fees, First-Year 
Medical School Students 2004-2005” by the Association of American Medical Colleges, 
average first-year student payments for medical school in the US, including tuition fee, 
amount to approximately US$35,000. In Japan, first-year students must pay 3,800,000 
yen (or 37,000 US dollars, based on an exchange rate of $1=¥105). In comparison, the 
average university tuition fee in the US is about $2,100 for a public school and $20,000 
for a private school. In Japan, a private school costs about 1,400,000 yen, whereas a 
public school costs about 800,000 yen. This example shows that medical school is 
extremely expensive compared to other fields of higher education. 
A student who enters medical school is prepared to pay the requisite tuition fees 
because he or she expects the value-added from the school to outweigh its burden. The 
value-added components, including human capital accumulation and the development 
of human networks, directly increase the student’s income. The purpose of this paper is 
to measure how the student expects to gain from the school. The estimated 
value-added for each student can be used to evaluate the total value of medical 
education. 
The evaluation of medical schools is important for the determination of social 
policies, not only when higher education is being considered, but also when decisions 
are made about the national medical systems, such as determining the total number of 
medical doctors, providing primary and secondary care network systems, and so on. 
However, as Schneider (2002) and Chun (2002) mentioned, it is not easy to evaluate 
value-added of higher education because their output is not clearly defined. In a recent 
work, Cawley et al. (1999) found there was a relation between wages and test scores 
but it has not only an intuitive and simple relation but also theoretical background. 
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Cawley et al. (1999) insisted that the test scores do not fit the measure of value-added. 
Yunker (2004) provided a method for measuring higher education in an accounting 
school. He defined the value-added as the difference between the observed records of 
accounting examination and the estimated scores. Spetz (2002) focused on the 
value-added for nursing education and showed that students chose higher education 
because of the advantages conferred by working positions or personal endowments. 
In the present paper, we build upon the accumulated empirical results by proposing 
an economic model to measure the value-added of universities for each student and by 
conducting an empirical research. We use medical school tuition fees and data on 
school characteristics as independent variables to explain the difficulty level of the 
college. We consider that the difficulty level of the university reflects the student’s effort 
level. Benjamin and Hersh (2002) mentioned that college rankings do not report the 
college value-added because the variety of output by universities creates ambiguities. 
However, in this paper, we avoid this ambiguity regarding outputs by focusing on 
medical school. Almost all students attend the medical school to become medical 
doctors. 
The model clarifies the relationship between the difficulty level and the value-added 
of the medical schools, and formulates an estimable equation with observable data. The 
empirical result allows us to evaluate not only the value-added of the medical schools 
for each student, but also the total value-added of the school. Using the estimated 
value-added, we made a comparison of the public and private schools. This estimated 
relationship is useful for conducting a simulation study of the process of privatization of 
public schools. This simulation provides interesting information about the effects of 
university system reform in Japan. In 2004, all the national universities had an 
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institutional change from directly managed entities to agencies that entrusted a 
university education. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 
describes the data set, and section 4 describes the results of the estimation and the 
simulation. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider the model about a student’s behavior toward the entrance examinations of 
a university. Suppose that a student has a utility function as follows: 
).e(F)w(HU −=        (1) 
The function describes his or her utility from the consumption of ordinary goods and 
services H(w) minus the disutility F(e) arising from the effort to enter the medical school. 
The ideal combination of goods is represented by a quantity of w and a price of q. In 
addition, we incorporate all the costs incurred to pass the entrance examination of the 
medical school, including the cost of a preparation school and the time and effort 
involved in preparing for the examination. We refer to these as the “effort level”, denoted 
by e. We assume that H(w) has a positive first order differentiation and a negative 
second order derivative. F(e) is assumed to have a positive first order derivative and a 
positive second order derivative. We assume that the probability of passing the 
entrance examination, p(e), depends on the student’s effort level and that it is strictly 
increasing, 00 <> ''p,'p . We assume that the student will earn a fundamental income, 
M, whether she attends the medical school or not. When he or she goes to medical 
school, an additional income, G, will be obtained, which we refer to as “value-added” in 
this paper. For example, a high quality education or the development of a human 
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network with the graduates of the medical school will increase the student’s wages. In 
other words, G represents the wage differences between the graduates of medical 
school and those of high school. Then, the student’s budget constraint can be described 
as follows: 
.G)e(pMC)e(pqw +=+       (2) 
Here, the school tuition fee is C.1 The school tuition fee and the additional income G 
must be zero when the student does not enter the college. Solving (2) with w and 
substituting it into (1), we obtain the first order condition with e as follows: 
0=−− )e('F)e('p)CG(
q
)w('H
.      (3) 
(3) can be rewritten as 
)e('p
)e('F)CG(
q
)w('H =− . Then, using the monotonicity of p’(e) 
and F’(e), there exists some value of e to satisfy the equation. We derive an equation of 
the effort level as follows:  
.)CG(
q
)w('Hhe ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=        (4) 
The inverse function of [ ].CG,whe −=  is equal to 
)e('p
)e('F
. Taking this equation with 
the budget constraint (2), we find that: 
.qwM)CG()CG(
q
)w('Hhp =+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −      (5) 
The left-hand side of equation (5) is a strictly decreasing function of w. If M is a positive 
value, then there is one solution for w with a given )CG( − . By contrast, if the left-side 
of (5) is a strictly increasing function of )CG( − , then the consumption level w is 
described as a function of the value-added of the school and the school tuition fees, 
                                                  
1 We can make the constraint with inequality. However, if the constraint does not bind, the 
student can enjoy an extra marginal unit of consumption goods, so we assume that the 
relationship holds with equality. 
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)CG(Ww −= . Eliminating w from equation (4) of effort level, we obtain the reduced 
form of the effort level: 
)CG(ke −= .       (6) 
Then, the effort level e can be represented as a function of G and C. This means that 
the student effort level correlates positively with the value-added and negatively with the 
school tuition fees. In other words, when the value-added of the medical school is given, 
the student faces a trade-off between his or her effort level and the tuition fee.2  
Now, let the difficulty level of the ith medical school, Li, be a function of the student’s 
effort level, so we set Li=L(ei). The relation between the difficulty level and the student’s 
effort is positive, because students have to study hard to enter a difficult school. 
Substituting (6) into L(ei), we obtain: 
[ ] )CG(L)CG(eLL iiiii −=−= .      (7) 
Then, we can see that the difficulty level is a function of the additional value of the 
school minus the school tuition fees. The added-value will increase the difficulty level 
while the school tuition fees decrease the difficulty level. We approximate (7) by a linear 
function: 
iiii X)CG(L δ+−β+α= ,       (8) 
where α  represents the minimum difficulty level. The differences in difficulty levels 
arise because of the gap between the value-added and the school tuition fees, 
converted by the parameter, β . The parameter β  denotes the conversion factor from 
the cash based variables to the difficulty level. Other factors, like location or 
                                                  
2 Research by Epple et al. (2004) supports this result. These authors constructed a 
theoretical and empirical model about student and school behavior, and then concluded that 
there was a negative correlation between school tuition fees and student ability.  
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environment effects, are included as iXδ .3 In addition, we assume that the college 
difficulty level is zero when the benefits and costs of the school are equal and the 
environmental effects are zero. No student will expend any effort for zero additional 
income. Hence, the minimum difficulty level, α , becomes zero. 
Next, we consider the value-added term, iGβ . We separate this term into two parts, 
an observable and an unobservable part. First, we represent iGβ  as: 
.ZG i
J
j
ijji ε+γ+γ=β ∑
=1
0        (9) 
The term,∑
=
γ
J
j
ijjZ
1
, which is a linear combination of the observable factors of the 
value-added of the university i is observable, as is the constant term, 0γ . The other 
term iε , which is assumed to be an error term, represents the unobservable part. In the 
present paper, we assume that the error term, iε , has a normal distribution with a zero 
mean and a 2σ  variance.4 Substituting (9) into (8), we obtain the equation below: 
.XZCL ii
J
j
ijjii ε+δ+γ+β−γ= ∑
=1
0       (10) 
Our assumptions about iε  make the ordinary least squares method appropriate in the 
estimation of equation (10). 
Finally, we estimate the value-added of the university, according to the estimated 
result of equation (10): 
.eXˆZˆCˆˆL ii
J
j
ijjii +δ+γ+β−γ= ∑
=1
0       (11) 
βˆ , δˆ , and jγˆ (j=0,1,…J) are the estimated parameters of β ,δ , and jγ , respectively. 
                                                  
3 Strictly speaking, iXδ  consists of several components. In our empirical analysis, we set 
∑θ+θ=δ
j
ijji YX 0 , where ijY  is jth environmental factor of the ith school, for example 
the population of its district. 
4 It is not important to assume its mean zero because the constant term 0γ  adjusts the 
deviation of the mean from zero. 
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The residual of the estimation is represented as ei. Substituting these estimated 
parameters into (9) and then considering an equation (8), we can derive: 
.XˆCˆL
eZˆˆGˆ
iii
i
J
j
ijji
δ−β+=
+γ+γ=β ∑
=1
0
       (12) 
Recalling that βˆ  is the conversion factor from the cash base unit to the difficulty level, 
we find the cash-based value-added of the college using the inverse of βˆ  from (12); 
.ˆ
XˆCˆLG iiii β
δ−β+=        (13) 
The denominator of (13) represents the modified difficulty level of the college where the 
school tuition fees and the environment effects are controlled. Measuring (13) allows us 
to compare the values between universities. 
 
3. Data 
In Japan, almost every student faces severe competition when attempting to enter a 
university.5 It is especially difficult to enter medical school, more so than any other 
department. A student who was unfortunate enough to fail his or her entry exam must 
face preparing the exam the following year. It is not a rare phenomenon that a student 
will spend three or four years attempting to enter the university of his or her choice. 
The only way for a student to become a medical doctor is to enter a medical school. 
According to the overview of the 2003 entrance exam, the highest competition rate for 
medical schools was about 40.0; that is, there is one successful candidate for every 39 
failed students.6 Because medical doctors get high incomes, students rush to take the 
                                                  
5 This kind of phenomenon is observed in South Korea, China, and other Asian countries.  
6 The average competition rate for medical schools was about 12.1, and the lowest was 
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entrance examinations in medical schools. This high competition rate shows that 
excess demand exists for medical school.7 
There are 79 medical schools in Japan, including public and private universities. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our data. The degree of difficulty of entrance 
exams to medical schools was obtained from the College Guide 2005, a guidebook for 
colleges and entrance examinations in Japan. The data was based on the survey by 
Sundai Preparatory School, one of the most famous preparatory schools in Japan. 
Figure 1 compares the difficulty levels of medical schools. The highest difficulty level for 
a medical school entrance exam was for The University of Tokyo, which reached 71. 
The lowest level was 55 for Kawasaki Medical School. National universities were in the 
top ranks of the lists, with private universities following. Among the national universities, 
the previous imperial schools were ranked relatively higher. Of the private schools, two 
long-established schools, Keio University and Nippon Medical School, have higher 
difficulty levels. 
School tuition fees were based on Obunsha’s Keisetsu Jidai, which is a college 
guide in Japan. In Japan, medical schools have six-year courses, so we derive the 
school tuition fees as the sum of the admission charge and the course fees for six years. 
The admission charge is needed when a student enters university, whereas the course 
fee covers lecture fees and facilities expenses. There is no difference in tuition fees 
among the national schools; it costs 3,406,800 yen, which is the lower than the fees of 
private schools. Turning to the private schools, Kyorin University charges the highest 
tuition fees of 51,808,400 yen. The average fee among private schools is about 29 
                                                                                                                                                  
about 4.8.  
7 The demand function has been observed in the US, originally by Sloan (1971) and 
recently by Quinn and Price (1998). 
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million yen. 
The variables representing the medical school value-added are the pass rate of the 
national examination for medical practitioners, the year of establishment, the quota of 
the school, the dummy for previous imperial universities, the dummy for previous 
medical colleges, and the dummy for previous medical academies. It is important for 
students to pass the national exam for medical practitioners, so its pass rate indicates 
the quality of the school’s education. The highest rate is 100% for Nagasaki University 
and Jichi Medical School. The lowest score is 78% for Dokkyo University’s School of 
Medicine. The average pass-rate is about 91%. The establishment year represents the 
effect of school tradition. A school that has been established for some time will have 
accumulated well-organized curriculums, teaching materials, and human networks. 
These factors are beneficial for students. The quota of the college also affects the 
difficulty level, but its impact may be ambiguous. A smaller quota can have a positive 
aspect as it means students have fewer classmates and greater access to instruction 
from their professors. On the other hand, smaller quotas can have a negative effect as 
they mean that fewer alumni exist. 
Dummy variables reflect the status of the medical schools before World War II. The 
status of medical schools is explained in Table 2. There were seven previous imperial 
universities, 10 previous medical colleges, and 29 previous medical academies before 
World War II in Japan. While all the previous imperial universities have become national 
universities, the previous medical colleges and academies have become both national 
and private schools. The dummy variables take a value of one for these schools and 
zero for other schools. 
The previous imperial universities have a long history and have maintained their 
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positions as headquarters of research and education since their foundation. Medical 
schools in Japan are strongly connected with hospital personnel. A school with a longer 
history has greater power over personnel issues than does a school with a shorter 
history. The students who graduate from the former type of schools obtain a relatively 
broad human network. 
A previous medical college has an advantage for graduates because the medical 
colleges act as centers of medicine in their local areas. They are strongly connected not 
only to schools, but also to hospitals in the district. Therefore, a student who graduates 
from a previous medical college will find it easy to obtain a position. 
The local population affects the difficulty of a school’s exams because a student 
from an area with a high population faces stronger competition from rivals than do 
students in other areas. The data source on local population is the National Census 
from 2000. Tokyo has the maximum population and Tottori has the minimum. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Results of the estimation 
The estimated results of equation (9) are shown in Table 3. First, we use all the 
candidates of the explanatory variables in the estimation. We call this model the “full 
model”. Subsequently, we drop some variables that are statistically insignificant. We call 
this the “selected model”. Despite of the cross-section data, our models are well fitted 
since the adjusted R2 exceeds 0.800 in both of models. In the remaining sections, we 
discuss the implications arising from the selected model. 
The coefficient of school tuition fees was -0.132 with 1% statistical significance. This 
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results support our assumption that a student’s effort level is negatively correlated with 
school tuition fees. The student makes a great effort to enter a school with low tuition 
fees. There are positive signs for dummy variables. Every coefficient of the dummy is 
statistically significant at 1%. The dummy for previous imperial schools is estimated to 
be 4.969 with a 1% level of significance. A rich tradition, a high standard of education, 
and a strong human network on a nationwide scale add value to students in previous 
imperial universities. The dummy for previous medical colleges has a positive sign. The 
difficulty level is raised 2.75 points by the medical college’s status. The graduates will 
receive benefits from the medical college. The benefits are not only a high quality 
teaching system but also the human networks developed. It is observed that the 
difficulty level and the dummy for previous medical academies have a positive 
correlation. It is increased about 1.36 points. Its historical performance and education 
level are assessed but their influences are less than the previous imperial schools or the 
previous medical colleges. 
The coefficient of the pass rate of the national examination for medical practitioners 
is estimated to be positive and significant. Because the pass rate of the national exam 
reflects the quality of the curriculum, a student whose school achieves a higher pass 
rate can accumulate greater human capital during his or her school days. The student is 
willing to make a greater effort and pay more to enter the school. 
We estimate the coefficient of population as an environment factor. It is estimated to 
be positive with a 5% significant level. The results show that a school located in a larger 
population area has a higher difficulty level. This supports our assumption that 
congestion causes serious competition and raises the difficulty level. 
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4.2. Comparing value-added 
Using the estimation results above, the value-added of a medical school can be 
measured by calculating equation (13). This formula is used to obtain the value-added 
in order to remove the effect of school tuition fees and the environmental influence from 
the difficulty level, and to adjust with the coefficient of school tuition fees. Figure 2 
reports the results of value-added per student. The bars of national schools are colored 
gray while those of private school are colored black. The range of value-added is from 
about 430 million yen to 530 million yen. These values exceed the measurements of the 
lifetime wages of a hospital doctor by Arai (1998), who reported that the average wage 
was about 240 million yen. However, our results represent the average lifetime income 
of private practitioners, who earn much more than do hospital doctors. 
The previous imperial schools have a high rank. The University of Tokyo, which has 
the number one ranking has been the center of research and education in Japan. A 
student improves his or her abilities by obtaining a high quality education in the school.  
The previous medical colleges and academies form the group with the second 
highest ranking. As these schools were established before World War II, their long 
history is a major source of value-added for graduates. In contrast, a college established 
after World War II is given a lower scores than another public university because 
graduates from these new medical schools face a shortage of job opportunities because 
of their lack of human networks. 
In addition, a student working in a hospital has an advantage because when he or 
she is faced with an obstinate disease patient, the student is allowed to transfer the 
patient to the related university hospital. The university hospitals of previous imperial 
schools and previous medical colleges have relatively greater facilities than other 
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hospitals, a student who graduates these schools have more opportunities to cure 
disease than other student. This strongly connects to lifetime income for medical doctor. 
Focusing now on the comparison between private and public schools, some private 
schools, like Keio University or Nippon Medical School, can offer a value-added that is 
very close to that of the previous imperial schools. These schools are the previous 
medical colleges with a long history. In addition, although Jichi Medical School was 
established relatively recently, it obtains a high ranking because its national examination 
pass rate is high. Although some schools have relatively high rankings, most of the 
private schools obtain relatively low rankings. The reason for this result is their 
expensive school tuition fees. 
The aggregated value-added of medical schools is reported in Figure 3. The 
aggregated value-added is calculated as the product of the value-added per student 
and the quota of school. This value could be one benchmark that represents the 
contribution of the school in a year. The highest value is about 60 billion yen for Tokyo 
Medical College and the second highest is about 55 billion yen for Showa University. 
Both of these are private schools. Although these schools do not have a relatively 
higher student value-added, their quotas are higher than those of other schools. On the 
other hand, Kyoto University and the University of Tokyo follow the former private 
schools in terms of the aggregated value-added. From the point of view of the value of 
medical schools, the difference between public and private schools is smaller than the 
differences between value-added for students. 
 
4.3. Simulation: Competition between national and private schools 
In 2004, all the national universities changed their institutional system. Before the 
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reform, they were directly founded and operated by the country. Subsequently, they 
became agencies entrusted with Japan’s university education. Under this system, the 
government has power to guide their tuition fees using subsidy policy. However, in the 
near future, it is expected that the universities will behave as private universities do, 
including setting the level of their tuition fees independently. Under the current 
institutional reforms, the national universities will not become private universities in the 
near future. However, as an extreme case, we should simulate the case where all the 
public schools are privatized. This simulation is important because it will shed light on 
the need for public schools in medical education. The value-added figures that were 
calculated in the previous section have important roles in this simulation. National 
schools will need to raise their tuition fees when the privatization occurs. Given our 
student behavior model in section 2, such a reform will cause the difficulty level of public 
schools to fall because of increasing tuition fees. The difficulty level of post-privatization 
schools is re-calculated in the following simulation. We assume that the public schools 
are required to increase their tuition fees to the average level of private school tuition 
fees when privatization occurs. The average private school tuition fee is 29,049,900 yen. 
In addition, we assume that all schools keep their value-added level before and after 
privatization. 
The difficulty levels of post-privatization medical schools are reported in Figure 4. 
Following privatization, the highest difficulty level is achieved by Keio University, which 
is a private school. Because the student effort level decreases as the national school 
tuition fees are increased, the difficulty level of the national school decreases. Then, the 
private schools, especially Keio University, Nippon Medical School, and Jichi University 
are ranked in the upper levels. Further, the other private schools catch up with the 
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national schools. Therefore, it seems that privatization will mean the difficulty levels of 
private and public universities will be equalized. For example, the rank-sum statistics for 
Figures 1 to 4 are 0.055, 0.027, -0.023, and 0.016, respectively. The absolute values of 
these statistics are close to zero, which means that the distribution of public and private 
schools is less biased. This shows that there are no advantages for the public schools 
after the privatization. In other words, the public schools will face more competitive 
student markets. At that time, their traditions are not so important, but their educational 
standard becomes more important. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper constructs a model that explains students’ efforts to pass an entrance 
examination and then derives the value-added of medical schools using the estimated 
results of the model. This model shows a negative correlation between the difficulty 
level and the school tuition fees because students do not study hard to enter a school 
with high tuition fees. This prediction is supported by our empirical result that a student 
faces a trade-off between paying high tuition fees or a high effort level. The estimated 
value-added of medical school is consistent with Arai’s (1998) estimation because, in 
contrast to Arai, our results include the income of private practitioner. 
Comparing the estimated value-added of each school, we initially find that a student 
who belongs to a national school obtains a higher value-added than does a private 
school student. The long experience of the medical schools that were established 
before World War II give a higher value-added to their students. 
A simulation for evaluating the privatization of national schools shows that a private 
school will achieve the highest post-reform value and that the difficulty level of private 
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schools will be much closer to those of public schools. These results imply that the 
school tradition is still meaningful, but the quality of education is also important. 
Finally, directions for future research should be noted. It would be possible to use 
our approach to evaluate colleges in other countries, such as South Korea and East 
Asian countries, where college entrance is based on an examination system similar to 
the Japanese system. Because of strong competition among students, the difficulty 
level of the entrance exam may represent the value of schools. Another possibility is the 
application of our approach to countries that do not have difficult entrance examinations, 
but do require hard study for graduation. In such a case, we could evaluate the difficulty 
level for graduation when applying our method of analysis. 
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Table 1 
Definition and summary statistics of variables
Variables (unit) Obs. Mean S. D. Max Min
Difficulty level of entrance exam by Sundai Prep. Scho79 63.84 3.41 71 55
School tuition fees (million yen) 79 12.93 13.27 51.80 3.41
Pass rate of national medical doctor examination (%) 79 0.93 0.04 1.00 0.78
Year of foundation (A.D.) 79 1961 11.50 1981 1949
Quota of school (person) 79 94.11 9.60 120 60
Population (Million person) 79 5.069 4.203 0.613 12.06
Note: Obs. means observations and S.D. means standard deviation.  
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Table 2 
Types of medical colleges
The previous The previous The previous The schools established 
   imperial universities    medical colleges    medical academies     after WWII
Hokkaido Univ. Chiba Univ. Sapporo Medi. Univ. Asahikawa Medi. Coll.
Tohoku Univ. Niigata Univ. Hirosaki Univ. Akita Univ.
The Univ. of Tokyo Kanazawa Univ. Fukushima Medi. Coll. Yamagata Univ.
Nagoya Univ. Kyoto Prefectural Univ. of MedicineGunma Univ. Univ. of Tsukuba
Kyoto Univ. Okayama Univ. Tokyo Medi. and Dent. Univ. Toyama Medi. and Pharm. Univ.
Osaka Univ. Nagasaki Univ. Yokohama City Univ. Fukui Univ.
Kyushu Univ. Kumamoto Univ. Shinshu Univ. Yamanashi Univ.
Keio Univ. Gifu Univ. Hamamatsu Univ. 
The Jikei Univ. Nagoya City Univ. Shiga Univ.
Nippon Medi. School Mie Univ. Shimane Univ.
Osaka City Univ. Kagawa Univ.
Kobe Univ. Ehime Univ.
Nara Medi. Univ. Kochi Univ.
Wakayama Medi. Univ. Saga Univ.
Tottori Univ. Oita Univ.
Hiroshima Univ. Miyazaki Univ.
Yamaguchi Univ. Univ. of The Ryukyus
The Univ. of Tokushima Jichi Medi. School
Kagoshima Univ. Dokkyo Univ. 
Iwate Medi. Univ. Saitama Medi. School
Juntendo Univ. Kitasato Univ.
Showa Univ. Kyorin Univ.
Tokyo Medi. Coll. Teikyo Univ.
Tokyo Women's Medi. Coll. Tokai Univ.
Toho Univ. St. Marianna Univ.
Nihon Univ. Kanazawa Medi. Univ.
Osaka Medi. Coll. Aichi Medi. Univ.
Kansai Medi. Univ. Fujita Health Univ.
Kurume Univ. Kinki Univ.
Hyogo Coll. of Medicine
Kawasaki Medi. School
Univ. of O.E.H.J.
Fukuoka Univ.
Note: Private schools are written in bold.
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Table 3 
Estimation results for difficulty level of medical school with OLS
Estimation method full model selected model
School tuition -0.131*** -0.132***
(-6.226) (-6.589)
Dummy for the imperial univ. 5.791*** 4.969***
(4.032) (6.930)
Dummy for the medical college 3.533*** 2.746***
(2.665) (4.706)
Dummy for the medical academy 2.063* 1.360***
(1.901) (3.220)
Passrate of national exam for 0.234*** 0.236***
   medical practitioners (5.162) (5.410)
Year of foundation 0.033
(0.683)
Quota of university 0.004
(0.164)
Population 0.135** 0.133**
(2.222) (2.234)
Constant -23.809 41.582***
(-0.251) (10.186)
Observations 79 79
Adjusted R-squared 0.800 0.804
Note: t-ratios are in parentheses.
　　　* Significant at 10%.
　　　** Significant at 5%.
　　　*** Significant at 1%.  
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Fig. 1 Difficulty level of medical school
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Note: Public schools are colored gray and private schools are colored black.
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Fig. 2 Added-Value of medical  schools per student
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Fig. 3 Total Added-value of medical school
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Fig. 4 Comparison of difficulty level of medical school after privatization: a simulation
Note: Public schools are colored gray and private schools are colored black.
 
